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  11.  Introduction:  Fiscal Autonomy in Russia and China 
Because of their size, strategic importance, and the magnitude of the institutional 
changes they have experienced during economic transition, the economic policies and 
performance of Russia and China provide dramatic experiments for the social scientist.  
A key element of each country’s transition has been the attempt to construct a fiscal 
system providing a coherent framework for accountability of the government’s use of 
public funds.  
At the end of the 1990s, the contrast between China’s rapid growth and structural 
change and Russia’s economic decline focused attention on the difference in Chinese and 
Russian governmental institutions and policies.  Today, as Russia enjoys the short-run 
benefits of exchange rate depreciation and high energy prices, the contrast between the 
two economies has weakened.  Yet, China’s rapid structural change and integration into 
the world market stands in contrast to Russia’s continued role as an exporter of raw 
materials. 
In both countries, the early years of transition were associated with fiscal 
decentralization.  In each of the transition economies, fiscal decentralization was a central 
piece of economic policy reform, for, as reforming economies became more 
decentralized and market-based, the public finances became the primary instrument for 
supplying public goods, protecting vulnerable members of society, and maintaining 
growth and stability.  Yet, while fiscal decentralization fostered rapid growth in China, in 
Russia, de facto fiscal decentralization had dire consequences.  Russia’s decentralization 
was an unintended consequence of state failure at the center, as the central government 
transferred more and more of its expenditure obligations onto regional governments that 
lacked access to tax revenues and administrative capacity.  
In both countries, a period of strong decentralization was followed by a 
recentralization of tax revenues to the center, beginning in 1995 in China and in 1999 in 
Russia.  In China, the tax reform of 1994 established clear tax sharing rules, assigning a 
growing share of tax revenue to the center.  In Russia, too, a new tax code legislated in 
1998-2002, assigned the largest sources of tax revenue, notably the value added tax and 
export taxes to the federal government.  In each case, the motivation for re-centralization 
  2was the improvement of institutional infrastructure and creation of a social safety net for 
the most vulnerable members of society.  But much remains to be done in both countries. 
Today, the budget structures of the two countries show many formal similarities, 
but the de facto operations of central and sub-national bureaucracies diverge.  Most 
Western discussions of fiscal efficiency start from the assumption that there is a separate, 
tax-based fiscal system in place.  However, neither Russia nor China has succeeded fully 
in establishing an effective, tax-based system for provision of local infrastructure, 
pensions, and a social safety net.  The reform of the governmental fiscal system in each 
country is incomplete. 
Fiscal systems in Russia and China differ in characteristics that cut across the 
assignment of responsibilities between the center and sub-national levels.  We argue that 
a key difference between Russian and Chinese fiscal performance lies not only in the 
degree of decentralization, but, rather, in China’s greater success in creating an 
autonomous fiscal system separate from other economic activity.  Although China’s 
delivery of health, educational, and infrastructure services at the local level depends on 
an array of extra-budgetary fees, the delivery of public services appears to be more 
transparent than in Russia.   
We posit that the Russian fiscal system presents noteworthy shortcomings relative 
to the Chinese system.  These include lack of transparency in the capture of energy 
revenues, lack of integration of fiscal expenditures into a unified Treasury system, and 
massive implicit subsidies in relationships between producers and both national and sub-
national governments.  Further, we argue that, at least in the rapidly-growing coastal 
provinces of China, the public sector in China is moving more rapidly than in Russia 
toward a greater orientation to growth-supporting activities.  With all its shortcomings, 
the emerging sub-national public sector in China appears to have stronger incentives to 
foster the expansion of competitive foreign-assisted and non-state firms than does the 
Russian state.  Although high energy prices currently generate a strong budget surplus in 
Russia, the Russian government has done little to foster diversification of its economy. 
 
  32.  The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization 
Decentralization of governmental fiscal responsibility has been a component of 
much economic reform, providing contradictory evidence of the economic consequences.  
The case for fiscal decentralization rests on the assumption of heterogeneity of regional 
preferences or the benefits of competition.  When communities have heterogeneous 
tastes, the government closest to the citizens can deliver a bundle of services that reflects 
community preferences.  Similarly, the Tiebout model (1956) posits that, with capital and 
labor mobility, local governments are motivated by competition with other governments 
to provide public goods efficiently.  Alternatively, centralization may work better when 
externalities are present, or when the central government is unable to credibly commit to 
hard budget constraints (Rodden, Eskeland, & Litvack, 2003).   
Decentralization in command economies that lack mechanisms for horizontal 
exchange often proves disastrous (Kornai, 1992: 406).  Regional governments devolve 
into autarkies, capital and labor are not mobile, and the decentralized response to central 
targets requires destabilizing fiscal bailouts. 
 Qian and Roland (1996) argue that fiscal decentralization is one of several factors 
affecting the hardness of local government’s budget constraint.  Qian and Roland (1998) 
model fiscal decentralization as a commitment device for the central government when 
fiscal competition increases the opportunity costs of bailouts. Comparing Russia and 
China, Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue that political centralization in China imposed 
discipline on regional governments, facing local officials with dismissal in the event of 
short-run rent seeking. 
A common feature of federations is that different levels of government share a 
common tax base.  An implication is that tax policies established by one locality will 
affect taxes collected by other localities as well as by the center.  Such tax externalities 
can lead to inefficient choices of tax rates by localities for several reasons.  First, if there 
is mobility of producers between jurisdictions, there will be horizontal tax externalities.  
An increase in one province’s tax rate, given the tax rates in other provinces, will lead to 
an outflow of the tax base to other regions.  The consequence is that the marginal cost of 
public revenues will be perceived by the region to be higher than the true marginal cost. 
  4This induces provinces to set tax rates on mobile resources that are too low from an 
efficiency point of view.   
Second, when central and sub-national governments share a common tax base, 
there are vertical tax externalities between levels of government that are taxing the same 
common pool.  An increase in a province’s tax rate causes its tax base to fall, which in 
turn causes tax revenues to fall both for the regional and for the central government.  The 
province, in choosing its tax policies, will neglect the adverse effect of its actions on 
federal revenues.  Thus, it will consider its marginal cost of public funds to be lower than 
the true value, leading it to set too high a tax rate. 
Further, when there are information asymmetries between regional governments 
and the center, additional common pool problems arise in the regional competition for 
federal transfers.   If sub-national spending is financed in total or in part by transfers from 
the center, while the federal transfers are financed by a general tax on the total tax base, 
then regions will view federal transfers as a common pool.  With information 
asymmetries, regions have incentives to undertake actions that will increase the in-flow 
of transfers and shift the tax burden to other regions. Local government may shelter local 
producers or tolerate an informal economy to reduce central taxes (Cai & Treisman, 
2004).  The center, in response, may conceal rents, for example, in the off-shore profits of 
Gazprom.   
Looking at the political consequences of decentralization, Weingast (1995) 
proposes that a properly designed decentralization is one way to make government more 
accountable to its citizens.  He uses the term “market-preserving federalism” for a fiscal 
decentralization that provides (1) a clearly delineated scope of governmental authority, 
(2) strong authority of sub-national governments in their jurisdictions, (3) centrally 
enforced prohibitions of barriers to trade and factor mobility, (4) hard budget constraints 
on revenue sharing and borrowing, (5) legal protection of the authority of sub-national 
government including protection from federal confiscation, and, thus, offers (6) 
incentives for regional governments to compete for investment and entry of new 
business. 
Our view of the Chinese case suggests to us that, in the coastal provinces of 
China, local governments, which retained most of marginal tax increases, and, thus, 
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economies to the world market, had incentives to pursue growth-supporting economic 
policies.  In Russia, in contrast, the source of increased governmental revenue depended 
more on rising prices of energy than on increased productivity in industry.  Regions 
derived little revenue from the rising value of their resources and strove to shelter their 
income from what they considered federal expropriation.  
 
3.  Initial Conditions in Russia and China 
Many of the differences we see in Russian and Chinese fiscal institutions today 
can be attributed to differences in the initial command economies of the Soviet Union and 
China. On the eve of economic reform, the Soviet Union and China shared many 
common features of the command economy, including state ownership of industry, 
collectivized agriculture, the centralized coordination of economic activities by an 
administrative hierarchy taking its direction from a Communist Party, an absence of true 
market prices, and the lack of legal alternatives to administrative plans.  It is these 
features that led Russian economists to wryly observe that the centrally-planned system 
could solve problems that other economies didn’t even have. 
The socialist fiscal system was implicit in the vertical structure of planning and 
prices.  In the Soviet Union, virtually all investment activity was channeled through the 
budget.  The primary nominal sources of tax revenue were enterprise profits and resource 
rents, turnover taxes charged on the difference between retail prices of consumer goods 
and their nominal enterprise cost, and profits of a foreign trade monopoly.  Loans from 
the central bank provided the treasury with an additional, inflationary source of spending, 
even though administrative pricing transformed this inflation into chronic shortages. 
In pre-reform China, too, savings were centralized in the government sector and 
investment was allocated by the government.  The tax system was implicit in the terms of 
trade established between agriculture and industry.  China maintained strict control over 
labor, a monopoly of agricultural procurement, and monopoly supply of industrial 
consumer goods.  Supplies of food and non-food consumer goods were scarce and subject 
to strict rationing. Low agricultural procurement prices and high industrial prices allowed 
  6the industrial sector to generate a surplus from profits and taxes equal to 25 percent of 
GDP (Naughton, 1996: 34). 
However, in 1978, China differed from the Soviet Union in its resource 
endowment and economic structure.  China was poor, and agriculture remained the 
dominant economic activity.  Peasants suffered from high rates of under-employment and 
vulnerability to income shocks.  In contrast to the Soviet Union’s large, vertically-
integrated state enterprises, Chinese industrial output was produced in relatively smaller 
state firms as well as in small collectives.  Infrastructure was weak, and there was little 
capacity to move commodities between provinces.   
  Decentralization of the planning system in China was linked to financial 
decentralization as well.  Sub-national governments and firms controlled depreciation 
allowances and profits of small-scale firms, which they could use for regional investment.  
Regional governments had instruments to influence the directions of local economic 
activity and incentives to use resources for growth (Wong, 1985).  Thus, Chinese central 
planners concentrated on a limited menu of tasks and elevated regional self-sufficiency to 
a virtue. 
  Qian, Roland, and Xu (2005) and Roland (2000:56-65) capture the stylized 
difference of Russian and Chinese coordination in their modeling of U-form and M-form 
organizations.  Soviet, vertically-integrated branch divisions represented U-form 
structures formed along functional lines, while in China, regionally-decentralized, M-
form structures could coordinate activities across all industries in a single region.  These 
decentralized arrangements reduced information costs, facilitated small-scale 
experimentation, and contributed to China’s increased flexibility.  However, in the 
absence of horizontal product and input markets, decentralization led to wasteful 
duplication and barriers to the movement of goods between provinces.  Still, Qian, 
Roland, and Xu identify as a defining characteristic of Chinese decentralization the 
ability to accommodate decentralized experiments in the pursuit of reform.  After the 
fact, decentralization that linked local tax collection to local expenditure provided 
incentives to pursue growth-supporting policies.  Such experimentation is an important 
component of China’s gradual transition.   
 
  74.  Evolution of the Chinese Fiscal System:  Decentralization and Growth 
China’s fiscal system has gone through three basic phases.  Before 1979, the 
central government had a formal monopoly over both revenues and expenditures.  
Between 1979 and 1993, under the economic reforms championed by Deng Xiaoping and 
his supporters, this fiscal system changed to a fiscal contract system, but there were at 
least six different types of contracts between provinces and the center, and little 
consistency between provinces or over time.  Provinces generally collected most of the 
revenue and then turned over a contracted portion to the center – sometimes a quota 
amount, sometimes a fixed share, sometime a combination of the two.  During this 
period, total fiscal revenues declined significantly as a share of GDP, and the center’s 
share of revenue also declined. 
The decentralized, experimental nature of early economic reform is clear in 
Chinese establishment of Special Economic Zones – export-oriented enclaves that were 
allowed to detach themselves partially from the central administrative apparatus and to 
operate with considerable autonomy.  Guangdong, which was allowed to set up its own 
foreign trade corporations, was a pioneer.  On the eve of reform, Guangdong seemed to 
have few advantages.  It had few natural resources, a low ratio of arable land per capita, 
and high rates of rural unemployment.  But its coastal location and proximity to Hong 
Kong presented the opportunity to forge a greater-Hong Kong trade area, linking 
enterprises to the world market, attracting foreign investment, and employing under-
utilized labor.  In 1979, the province’s political leaders negotiated a lump-sum transfer 
agreement with the center, under which they promised to transfer a fixed annual tax 
payment to the center, but would be allowed to retain all the additional revenues collected 
above that amount (Cheung, 1998, 89-137).   
Fujian, too, was permitted to open its economy in 1978.  In 1980, Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen were established as Special Economic Zones, and, in 1984, 
14 additional coastal cities were designated as coastal open cities under arrangements that 
offered lower tax rates, higher local shares of tax revenues, and special institutional and 
policy environments providing substantial local autonomy (Lin, Tao, and Liu, 2006). 
  Knight and Shi (1999) document some fundamental relationships and patterns in 
the Chinese fiscal data during this period.  They note a rising share of spending by 
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provinces enjoyed more spending, as a share of GDP, and more investment per capita.  
Fiscal transfers became less equalizing over time, thus transferring risk away from the 
center to the provinces.  The fiscal contract systems often faced the province with a high 
marginal tax rate, and thus acted as a disincentive for tax collection in the provinces. 
  In the late 1980s and again in the early-mid 1990s, the central government’s fiscal 
balance was threatened by a declining revenue share, and the CPI inflation rate rose to 
above 24 percent in 1994.  As Figure 1 illustrates, the inflation was not the result of 
budget deficits – since the total budget deficit never exceeded 1.2 percent of GDP during 
this period – but, instead, resulted from credit expansion as the state banking system was 
used to fund essentially state expenditures.  Between 1992 and 1995, M2 grew by an 
average annual rate of 36 percent, mostly due to lending to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) even as their share of output and profitability declined.  Each year, an increasing 
number of state-owned enterprises became unprofitable, often because of the burden of 
social services, pensions, and excess employment they were forced to provide.  
Government credits from local branches of the big four national state-owned banks 
allowed enterprises to share the costs of structural change, but at the cost of rising debt.  
While China’s inflation rates were low at the time compared to Russia’s hyperinflation, 
they nonetheless threatened macroeconomic stability and the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
In 1993-94, when the “Socialist Market Economy” policy encouraged a new wave 
of reform, fiscal reforms were put in place to clarify fiscal revenues and responsibilities, 
and it included three components:  a tax-sharing system, tax modernization, and a reform 
of tax administration that separated central and provincial tax collection. The new tax-
sharing arrangements allocated certain sources of revenues to the center (e.g., customs 
duties, consumption tax, sales tax, and profit taxes from centrally-controlled enterprises), 
to the provinces and municipalities (taxes on local enterprise income, house and property 
taxes, profit turnover taxes) and shared according to a predetermined ratio (the value-
added tax, natural resource taxes, stock market trading tax).  The tax modernization effort 
introduced new taxes to replace the former reliance on state enterprise profits, and it had 
the added effect of placing enterprises with different types of ownership on a relatively 
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administrative fees and other forms of extra-budgetary revenues.   
Figure 1 illustrates that these reforms quickly reduced official extra-budgetary 
revenues and expenditures.  In the case of official budget revenues, the regional share of 
total revenues fell by half, forcing regions to depend on transfers from the center to 
finance their expenditures.  Clearly these reforms benefited the center, since they now 
had greater control over more revenues, but the richer provinces appear to have won an 
important concession.  According to Shah and Shen (2006), 60 percent of the transfers in 
2004 resulted from revenue-sharing arrangements and tax rebates, and thus Shanghai 
became the largest recipient of transfers instead of just the largest net contributor.  Of the 
rest, a majority of transfers were earmarked for special purposes, and with the exception 
of a few regions like Tibet, Qinghai and Ningxia, poorer provinces now received fewer 
transfers per capita.  The reforms also fostered a gradual increase in total budgetary 
revenues, which helped to finance higher levels of government expenditure. 
Figure 2 illustrates the fiscal effects of these reforms.  While the central share of 
government expenditures remained relatively stable – peaking in 2000 in an effort to 
avoid a slowdown after the Asian Financial Crisis, the central share of government 
revenue more than doubled, while the center’s share of reported extra-budgetary revenues 
declined dramatically. As a share of total government expenditures, the consolidated 
government deficit rose modestly between 1997 and 2003, but the provincial deficit rose 
to 40 percent of their expenditures.   
China’s fiscal contract reforms in the early 1980s were clearly a decentralization 
of fiscal authority, but what about these 1994 tax reforms?  In spite of the fact that 
regions must now depend on large central transfers to finance their expenditures, Wong 
and Bird (2005) still consider China one of the most fiscally decentralized countries in 
the world.  Since 1994, regional and local governments have accounted for approximately 
60 percent of total government expenditure, versus a 34 percent average for industrialized 
economies (and about 38 percent for the U.S., if we include Social Security and 
Medicare) and a 22 percent average for less-developed countries.  But Tsui and Wang 
(2004) point out that China nonetheless remains politically centralized, since regional and 
local cadres are still managed by the top through the Target Responsibility System.  
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share of expenditures, the center still collects the vast majority of revenues and many of 
the transfers from the center to lower levels of government, which are necessary to cover 
their expenditures, are specific purpose grants (Shah & Shen, 2006). 
Most of the attention in the literature has been focused on the initial 
decentralization.  Tsui and Wang (2004) call fiscal decentralization a “handmaiden” to 
China’s growth.  Chen (2004) argues that regional and local governments have better 
information, and so more control over expenditures, leading to improved efficiency in 
government spending, and thus led to more growth.  Feltenstein and Iwata (2005) use 
national macro data to argue that decentralization led to both faster growth and higher 
inflation, but they do not separate the effects of fiscal and monetary decentralization.  
When China recentralized its monetary authority under Zhu Rongji, inflation fell and 
local governments took the lead in laying off workers from loss-making state-owned 
enterprises (Qian and Roland, 1998). 
Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2005) observe that provincial revenues and expenditures 
were more closely correlated in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s.  This correlation, 
they argue, shows a relative hardening of budget constraints.  They argue that, in China, a 
hard budget constraint provided local incentives to foster non-state development, 
increasing tax revenues and reducing state obligations.  Local benefits from economic 
growth also generated policies encouraging foreign direct investment. 
Zhang and Zou (1998) present a contrary view of Chinese provincial data, arguing 
that fiscal decentralization was associated with lower economic growth.  Lin and Liu 
(2000), on the other hand, question Zhang and Zou’s econometric model.  They show that 
if the model is extended to include the level of investment, and controlling variables 
measuring the impact of institutional reforms, then it appears that increased fiscal 
decentralization is associated with higher economic growth.  A recent empirical piece by 
Jin and Zou (2005) finds that a greater divergence between provincial revenues and 
expenditures (i.e., a larger role of the center in either taxing or subsidizing the province) 
is associated with higher provincial growth. 
  What determines provincial government spending?  Guillaumont Jeanneney and 
Hua (2004) ask why more open Chinese provinces have bigger governments, basing their 
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foreign trade and investment will have a higher demand for government services to insure 
against unanticipated shocks.  They find that richer provinces in China have a smaller 
government share and provinces with greater variance of income have a larger 
government share, but, in addition, the partial effect of greater openness is associated 
with a larger government share.  
Did the fiscal reforms of 1994 help China’s growth?  Because most of the above 
studies focused on the contrast between the Maoist era of central planning and the 
decentralized fiscal contracts of the reform era, their data sets usually ended by the mid-
1990s.  We focus on relatively recent experience, and examine the effect of fiscal 
variables on provincial-level growth rates from 1994-2004 for 31 Chinese provinces 
(including the four municipalities and the autonomous regions), using data collected from 
the China Statistical Yearbooks (CNBS, 1995-2005).  Our growth regressions take the 
following form: 
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Where Y is real provincial GDP, X is a vector of provincial-level control variables usually 
associated with growth, F is a vector of provincial-level fiscal variables, G is a vector of 
national-level fiscal variables, Y0 is the initial-year value of real provincial GDP, α, β, τ, 
γ, and θ are vectors of estimated parameters, and ε is the error term.  All right-hand side 
variables are lagged to minimize the endogeneity problem of reverse causality, and to 
minimize division bias they are usually expressed in real per-capita terms or as a share of 
revenue or expenditure. 
To find our X control variables, we initially regress growth on provincial 
investment per capita, the educational attainment rate (the share of the over-five 
population that has completed senior secondary school), the dependency rate, and the real 
per-capita amounts of foreign direct investment, exports, and imports.  Surprisingly, we 
find that the coefficients for most of these variables are either insignificant or even 
negative, which is a matter we shall study more closely in later research.  For our current 
purposes, however, we retain only exports per capita.    
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square, since Barro (1990) hypothesizes that the effect of the size of government on 
growth should be shaped like a inverted-U, along with real transfers from the center per 
capita, which we approximate as the provincial budget deficit.  We include expenditures 
on capital construction and reported social expenditures on health, education, and social 
support, both as shares of total provincial expenditures because the per-capita amounts 
are highly correlated with revenue and transfers.  Finally, we include the number of 
government administrative staff and workers per capita, which we found to be marginally 
more significant that the administration expenditure share. 
 Our  G national-level fiscal variables include the central government’s share of 
total government revenues, along with total government budgeted expenditures, the total 
government budget deficit, and total government extra-budgetary expenditures, all three 
expressed as a share of national GDP.  Finally, we include the initial-year provincial GDP 
(Y0) to check for convergence between provinces. 
We estimate our growth equation using four alternative approaches, in order to 
check for robustness and because we expect these data all have multi-directional 
causality.  We first estimate it using ordinary least squares (OLS) with a common α 
intercept.  We then use a pooled fixed effect model, which not only estimates separate 
intercepts for each province but also adjusts for different provincial variances in the error 
terms.  Third, we use a two-state least squares (2SLS) approach that instruments with 
initial-year values of the right-hand-side variables, and finally we estimate using the 
Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach, in which we 
difference our equation as follows: 
it it t it it it g G F X g ε ρ γ τ β α Δ + + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − − − 1 1 1 1  
Results are shown in Table 1.  When included with fiscal variables, even exports only 
have statistically significant values in two out of the four estimations.  Provincial 
revenues appear to have the expected inverted U-shape in three out of the four 
estimations, though these coefficients are significant in only the first and fourth.  In the 
second estimation the coefficients still have the expected signs, but in the third they don’t 
– even though they are insignificant – so we include only the first-order term.  In all four 
cases, however, if we drop the squared term then the first-order coefficient becomes 
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expenditures) only has a significant effect in the GMM estimation, though this effect too 
is negative. 
  Arguably, the most important result from these four regressions is the fact that the 
coefficient for the central share of government revenue is consistently positive and 
significant, which supports the argument that recentralization of revenues contributed to 
faster growth in the provinces.  This result should be taken with a grain of salt, however, 
since there is no inter-provincial variation in national-level variables, and further study is 
needed to confirm it. 
   Transfers from the center have a positive effect on provincial growth, a result 
which confirms those of Jin and Zou (2005), and in three of the cases the effect is 
statistically significant.  Deficits at the national level have a significant and negative 
effect, suggesting a prisoner’s dilemma of sorts, since one province benefits when it 
alone runs a deficit but does not when all run a deficit.  This also supports the argument 
that controlling the overall deficit through creation of a harder budget constraint is one of 
the benefits of China’s economic reform.  
How the provinces allocate their expenditures does not seem to have a significant 
and consistent effect on growth, at least not in these regressions.  Capital construction 
expenditures are only significant (and negative, which one would expect if SOEs 
hampered overall growth) in the 2SLS estimation, while social expenditures are 
significant in the first two estimations but of different signs.  The number of staff and 
workers in provincial government administration is only significant (and negative) in the 
2SLS case. 
Finally, the national share of extra-budgetary expenditures appears to be 
insignificant for growth, as does the initial value of provincial GDP (though it can’t be 
estimated in the fixed-effects and GMM cases).  This latter result is consistent with 
observations elsewhere that the provincial income inequality gap has widened. 
We next consider the determinants of each province’s revenue, expenditures, and 
transfers in separate OLS regressions.  For revenue and expenditures per capita, we 
express the left-hand side variable in logs, but transfers from the center can be negative 
so these are not transformed.  We regress these three variables on the log of GDP per 
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of national government revenues to GDP.  We include the educational attainment ratio in 
our revenue equation, the dependency ratio in our expenditure equation, and both in the 
transfer equation.  Finally, we include extra-budgetary revenues in the transfer equation 
to see if these affect the center’s willingness to fund provincial expenditures. 
The results are shown in Table 2.  All three left-hand side variables appear to be 
significantly correlated with provincial GDP, though these relationships need to be 
explored further to determine causality.  This correlation is significant, with elasticities 
for revenue and expenditures of approximately 0.80, and such high correlation between 
income and the provincial government budget suggests that China’s current fiscal system 
creates incentives for provincial government to follow growth-enhancing policies.  
Transfers are also significantly correlated with income, which refutes the null hypothesis 
that overall transfers compensate for inequality between provinces. 
Foreign direct investment appears to increase provincial revenues and decreases 
expenditures, thus reducing transfers from the center.  International trade leads to more 
revenue and more expenditures, which is consistent with the hypothesis of Rodrik (1998) 
regarding the relationship between government size and global risk, and the net effect of 
trade on transfers is positive and significant.  Higher national budgetary revenues appear 
to be positively correlated with higher provincial revenues, provincial expenditures, and 
transfers to the provinces, while extra-budgetary revenues do not have a significant effect 
on transfers.  Higher educational attainment appears to increase provincial revenue, a 
higher dependency ratio increases provincial expenditures, and these effects on transfers 
are consistent and significant. 
Finally, we run a third set of regressions to consider the determinants of 
provincial expenditures in three categories: social expenditures, capital construction, and 
administration.  Using OLS, we regress these expenditures per capita on GDP per capita, 
FDI and trade as a share of provincial GDP, provincial revenues and transfers as a share 
of  GDP, the central government’s share of total national-level revenues, the dependency 
ratio and the educational attainment ratio.   
The results in Table 3 show that all three are strongly correlated with both income 
and transfers from the center.  Social expenditures are significantly correlated with the 
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construction expenditures are correlated with the provincial revenue share only weakly, 
and government administration not at all, but both are negatively correlated with the 
national revenue share.  The first two expenditure regressions also have positive 
coefficients for both the dependency and educational attainment ratios.  
 
5.  Evolution of the Russian Fiscal System:  Fiscal Imbalance and Hyperinflation 
  On the eve of reform, the Russian economy was in crisis.  In 1991, repressed 
inflation worsened and real GDP declined 15 percent.  Rising costs and falling enterprise 
profits cut budget revenues, bringing the government budget deficit to16.5 percent of 
GDP.  Persistent price controls in the face of rising money supply created a large 
monetary overhang.  Goods disappeared from the shops, reappearing in ubiquitous black 
markets.  Exports fell by 40 percent and imports by 84 percent in dollar terms (Ahrend & 
Tompson, 2005). 
  On January 2, 1992, the new Russian government freed most consumer and 
producer prices, abolished the state foreign trade monopoly, and moved toward external 
liberalization, while retaining controls on energy exports.  The Gaidar government 
announced expenditure cuts and committed itself to slow the expansion of credit by the 
Central Bank of Russia.  There was an initial one-time jump in the price level of 245 
percent in January, 1992 followed by a continuing monthly price increase of 
approximately 10 percent.  However, CBR net credits accelerated sharply after the 
unpopular central bank chairman Georgy Matyukhin was replaced by Viktor 
Gerashchenko.  Gerashchenko authorized ballooning new credits to agriculture, industry, 
former Soviet republics, and the federal budget, increasing M2 at 30 percent per month.  
Price increases followed with an approximate four-month lag.  At the end of 1992, the 
price index stood at 2500 percent of the previous year (Granville, 1995). 
  Loss of fiscal balance and rising CBR credits together generated hyperinflation.  
The federal budget deficit peaked at -20.9 percent of GDP in 1992, declining to -10.7 
percent in 1993 and -9.8 percent in 1994.  During 1992, explicit budget subsidies equaled 
25 percent of GDP and Central Bank credits to enterprises amounted to another 19 
percent of GDP (Granville, 1995: 68). Russian commercial banks and enterprises 
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interest rates well below the rate of inflation.  Recipients of subsidized credits could 
exchange rubles for dollars, repaying, risk-free for a tidy profit.  Subsidized bank credits 
financed capital flight, as firms in primary industries transferred their production offshore 
to their own subsidiaries at low transfer prices, paying workers and suppliers with low-
interest credits.  The World Bank estimates that 18.9 percent of GDP was handed out as 
central bank credits at highly negative real interest rates in 1992 (Shleifer & Treisman, 
2000).  According to official data, real GDP fell by one-third between 1992-1994, with a 
continuing decline during 1995 and 1996. 
  The process of disinflation put new stresses on the Treasury.  In 1993, the 
Ministry of Finance launched the first short-term treasury bills (GKOs) with maturities 
from six weeks to twelve months. Over the next three years, these securities grew to a 
stock of about 159 trillion rubles ($31 billion).  The Central Bank sold these securities at 
primary auctions to a small number of authorized dealers who could then resell them.  
(Shleifer & Treisman, 2000: ch. 4).  Now, instead of profiting from low interest credits 
from the central bank, commercial banks holding state securities could get large positive 
returns by lending the Russian government short-term money at rates of return far above 
the rate of inflation.   
Central bank processes were designed to benefit specific constituencies.  Primary 
issues were limited to about twenty-five authorized dealers, including nineteen 
commercial banks.  The largest holder, with 44 percent of the GKOs in 1996 was the 
state savings bank, Sberbank, followed by another state-owned bank, Vneshtorgbank, 
with 22 percent of securities.  By prohibiting access of foreign and domestic investors to 
the primary GKO auctions, the government assured that prices would remain low and 
rates of return high.  Shleifer and Treisman (2000: 64) conclude, “Both systems—
inflationary finance and high-yield government securities—generated a transfer to the 
commercial banks from other parts of the economy.”  
  As the government reduced budget subsidies and credits, many of the subsidized 
organization became insolvent and ran up arrears to their suppliers, workers, and to the 
Treasury.  The largest arrears were owned to the electricity and energy sectors, and they, 
in turn amassed a huge debt to the budget in unpaid taxes.  The implicit bargain that 
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households without requiring any explicit budgetary expenditure.  In exchange, Gazprom 
and the electric power monopoly gained rights to export and enjoyed tax exemptions on 
foreign sales.   
  This implicit bargain created major governance problems.  For example, Gazprom 
paid regional taxes to Yamalo Nenets Autonomous Okrug by giving the territory 
ownership of natural gas at a price of about $2 per thousand cubic meters.  The territory, 
in turn, transferred the gas to a commercial enterprise, Itera, owned in part by family 
members of former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Gazprom General Director 
Rem Vyakhirov.  Itera then resold the gas at approximately $60 per thousand cubic 
meters on the export market (Twiss & McMillan, 2002).  
  Although implicit subsidies allowed insolvent firms and impoverished households 
to survive, by 1997, Russia’s public finances were in disarray.  Federal budget revenue 
fell from 19 to 12 percent of GDP.  Almost half of enterprise transactions were made by 
barter.  The untaxed, informal economy accounted for a significant share of retail sales, 
and the number of small and medium-sized private firms shrank.  Shleifer and Treisman 
(2000:90) ascribe this unravelling to “the often fierce and unregulated competition 
between levels of government within the evolving federation…The way authority and 
property rights were shared among central, regional, and local governments invited a 
catalogue of abuses and blunted incentives for economic development. 
  In August 1998, Russia experienced a drastic financial crisis as the government 
suffered a full scale sovereign default on ruble-denominated public debt.  On the eve of 
the crisis, the country was almost demonetized; ruble money supply was about 15 percent 
of GDP—considerably smaller than the estimated dollar money stock.  About half of 
industrial output was transacted through barter, and almost half of fiscal revenue was 
transacted as offsets.   
There were many forces contributing to crisis.  The price of oil plummeted to less 
than $12 a barrel.  There were political pressures opposing devaluation, since investors 
were borrowing short-term abroad and investing long-term at home.  Importantly, fiscal 
imbalance played a key role.  In 1998, consolidated budget expenditure (31.7 percent of 
GDP), exceeded consolidated budget revenue (25.6 percent), by 6 percent of GDP.  If we 
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consolidated budget plus extra-budget expenditure (41 percent of GDP) exceeded 
corresponding revenue (32.9 percent) by 7.1 percent of GDP.  Thus, government budget 
and extra-budget spending still took a large share of GDP.  
An infusion of $4.8 billion in foreign exchange reserves from the IMF 
disappeared quickly when the CBR cut reserve requirements and extended 32 billion 
rubles of credits to a few key banks.  When short-term government borrowing to finance 
the budget deficit exceeded foreign exchange reserve, short-term capital left the country.  
Devaluation fuelled a banking crisis as well, reflecting the currency and maturity 
mismatch of bank portfolios and the collapse of bank assets among the politically-
influential Moscow banks. 
In the wake of financial crisis, the Russian government finally took steps to put its 
fiscal budget in order.  A four-fold devaluation of the ruble was associated with a drop in 
real income of about 25 percent, but it re-kindled production in domestic import 
substituting industries.  With a recovery in energy prices, the government imposed export 
taxes on hydrocarbons, metals, and other commodities.  Tax compliance increased as the 
government began to enforce tax payment on Gazprom and the large petroleum 
exporters, requiring cash payment.  Tax exemptions were cut; tax revenues increased; and 
the federal government itself began to reduce its own payment arrears (IMF Statement, 
1999).  
Tax reform was a slow process.  Part I of a new Tax Code clarifying taxpayer 
rights and obligations passed in 1998.  In 1999, the government set up a unified tax 
authority, and in 2000 the Duma passed four chapters of Part II of the Tax Code.  These 
changes formalized tax-sharing between the federal, territorial, and local levels, assigning 
larger shares of the major taxes to the federal government.  Income taxes were cut to a 
flat 13 percent and profits taxes from 35 percent to 24 percent.   
By 2000, Russian recovery was underway.  With rising energy prices, the central 
bank undertook large-scale purchases of foreign exchange to stem exchange rate 
appreciation, and federal government budget revenue doubled from 12 percent to more 
than 20 percent of GDP in 2005—24 percent including a tax payment fro the oil 
company, Yukos. Inflation, which reached 84 percent in 1998, fell to 20 percent in 2000, 
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from a deficit of 6 percent to a surplus of 9 percent of GDP. 
 
6.  Russian Recentralization 
A recentralization of Russian budget execution after the election of Vladimir Putin in 
2000 was linked to significant administrative reforms aimed at consolidating the power of 
central political leaders.  First, President Putin undertook administrative changes intended 
to curb the power of provincial leaders.  In May, 2000, the federation was divided into 
seven federal districts, each headed by a presidential representative nominated by the 
president.  Most of these key administrative appointments were drawn from the power 
ministries (the military and security forces).  Next, in July, 2000, the provincial governors 
were removed from the Federation Council (the upper house of the parliament), with half 
of the members of the Federation Council to be nominated by provincial legislatures and 
half by the governors.  Finally, in December, 2004, gubernatorial elections were 
abolished, with governors serving at the will of the president.  Thus, in its administrative 
structures, the form of Russia’s government moved closer to China’s. 
According to law, Russia was hardly a federation.  Sub-national governments in 
Russia were always subject to federal control.  A single federal Tax Authority collected 
tax revenues and transferred them to the Ministry of Finance, which had the authority to 
determine expenditure priorities.  The federal government set tax rates and specified tax 
sharing rules in an annual federal budget law.  The annual budget law specified 
expenditure mandates for major categories of expenditure.  Regions and municipalities 
had authority to collect taxes on property and land and, for a time, had the right to levy a 
local sales tax of 5 percent.  But own revenues of sub-national units never exceeded 15 
percent of regional expenditure.  Their shares of retained taxes were determined by the 
center. 
Yet, even today, regions enjoy considerable informal autonomy.  There is still a vast 
difference between the budget system in theory and in practice.  These differences are 
spelled out in Lavrov, Litwack, and Southerland (2001).  In the 1990s, a long list of 
unfunded federal mandates imposed by the federal government on sub-national 
authorities required local initiatives.  Since regional governments were active participants 
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of subsidized fuel and energy, and in their regulatory powers—they exercised 
considerable discretion.  Regions sometimes levied taxes in kind—for example, taking 
delivery of a percentage of enterprise output informally and reselling it (Thornton, 2001).  
They relied on large enterprises to provide a host of social services—supplying housing, 
utilities, health and social services.  These in-kind services allowed regional governments 
to capture 100 percent of the in-kind tax, while many of the higher costs could be used to 
reduce official tax obligations of local producers.  Cai and Treisman (2004) model the 
perverse incentives created by Russian-style federalism, which gave local officials 
incentives to shelter local producers from central taxes. The dependence of local officials 
on in-kind services provided by large enterprises had a negative impact on long-run 
efficiency, creating incentives to shelter large, former state-owned units, protecting them 
from new, competitive entrants to the market. 
Until 2002, regions also enjoyed considerable control over national extra budgetary 
funds, such as the pension, social welfare, employment, medical insurance, and road 
funds.  In 2002, these funds were integrated into the consolidated treasury system, with 
the unified social insurance funds collected at the federal level and returned to the regions 
on a formula basis. 
While most of the Western discussion about the Russian budgetary system focuses on 
the incentives of provincial leaders to evade the rules, the structure of federal direct 
expenditures, bypassing the treasury system, introduces another set of problems.  Many 
line ministries and natural monopolies—the power ministries, railroads, energy 
monopolies, government banks, and others—receive direct funding.  Each ministry, 
separately, controls budget spending for its organizations in all regions, including 
responsibility for a full range of social services, educational organizations, hospitals, and 
housing for its employees.  Writing in 1999, Lavrov and Makushkin estimated that per 
capita federal direct expenditures were five times larger than the total of public services 
provided by formal budget funding (with almost half of those expenditures allocated to 
government employees in the Moscow region). 
Most of the recent process of budget reform involves improvement in the capacity of 
the Ministry of Finance to control and implement budget policy. In the 1990s, much 
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core institution responsible for federal budget policy was the Central Budget Department 
of the Ministry of Finance.  However, more than 100 vertically organized line ministries 
dealt with Branch Departments of the MoF.  The Central Budget Department was 
supposed to coordinate all of these separate branch proposals.  Similarly, in 89 regional 
and 22340 local offices, more than 50,000 Treasury officials attempted to coordinate 
budget allocations from myriad separate authorities with little information (Diamond, 
2002). 
  As budget reforms transferred most revenue authority to the federal level, the role 
of the Treasury increased in an attempt to provide a framework for a separate tax-based 
fiscal system.  Today, fiscal management is centralized in the Ministry of Finance, 
providing modern budgeting processes and procedures and a new treasury system with a 
unified accounting and financial management framework.  Under the new Budget Code, 
five state funds allocate most of the financial assistance provided to the regions:  
•  The fund for financial assistance to the regions provides subsidies based on a 
formal comparison of a region's tax potential and normative social obligations. 
•  The compensation fund is determined by the number of people in a region who 
qualify for federal compensation, including federal employees. 
•  The fund for co-financing social expenditures supplements social services. 
•  The fund for regional development provides publicly-financed capital investment.    
•  The fund for regional and municipal finance reform subsidizes local budgetary 
reform.  
A key element in the determination of budget expenditure is the Index of Budgetary 
Requirements.  This index is used to determine an indicator of normalized per capita 
expenditures.  Martinez and Boex (2001) write, “Conceptually, the new approach 
attempts to break with the Soviet-era practice of filling the gap between a region’s 
normative expenditure needs and the region’s fiscal resources, but in practice fails to do 
so completely.” 
  A step-by-step perusal of the crucial Index of Budgetary Requirements shows 
what actually happens.  Each region’s “needs” are assessed by calculated numbers of 
needy constituents (school children, pensioners, veterans, etc.) and the cost of serving 
  22needs of each group is determined by a regional index of budgetary cost.  However, the 
lists of groups served by budgetary needs include “veterans of social labor” (about 32 
million recipients), federal administrators, and security personnel and their families (6 
million recipients), and the budget costs of providing each group’s budget needs show 
considerable difference from other published measures of regional costs of living. Thus, 
incentive problems persist, but they appear in the political determination of constituencies 
and in the estimated budgetary costs assigned to each constituency. 
   The most recent fiscal reform is the monetization of many former free and 
subsidized social benefits introduced as Law 122 in January, 2005.  When the new 
arrangements were announced, tens of thousands of pensioners and public employees 
took to the street in mass protests.  The goal of monetization is the substitution of 156 
kinds of in-kind benefits and 236 categories of recipients with monetary grants.  There 
are many potential gains in efficiency and equity from this change.  With monetization, 
consumers will face the true costs of housing, utilities, transport, and holidays.  A shift to 
money benefits would encourage means testing of social programs.  A recent World Bank 
report estimates that large shares of in-kind and subsidized social benefits were allocated 
on the basis of public employment rather than social need.  For various benefit categories, 
employment-based benefits accounted for 43 percent of housing and utility services, 71 
percent of medical services, 66 percent of spas and holidays, ad 47 percent of all social 
benefits (World Bank, 2005: 91).   
  Table 4 summarizes the official distribution of tax revenues between government 
levels in 2004.  The federal government has the right to 100 percent of the value added 
tax and a majority of profit taxes, 100 percent of mineral extraction tax on gas and 95 
percent of mineral extraction tax on oil, and 100 percent of the export tax revenues on oil 
and gas.  Currently, federal government revenues, equal to about 24 percent of GDP, 
exceed regional and local revenues, equal to 15 percent of GDP.  Of federal revenues, 
trade duties (primarily energy export revenues) equal 8 percent of GDP, with other 
natural resource taxes providing an additional 4 percent (IMF 2005).    
  The aggregate data on the structure of total expenditures in Table 5 shows a stable 
pattern of spending by category between 1998 and 2004.  There is a large decline in 
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“other budget.” 
What determines the flow of budget transfers from the Russian central 
government to its constituent regions?  Since 1998, as high export taxes on energy have 
combined with rising world prices of oil, an increasing share of Russian budget revenue 
that previously was shared between the federal and sub-national levels is directed solely 
to the center.  The growth of the vertical fiscal gap between the federal and regional 
levels means that federal budgetary transfers have an increasing impact on regional 
welfare, inequality, and competitiveness.   
We look briefly at recent research on the determinants of government expenditure 
to ask whether Russian federal expenditures serve to reduce regional inequality, to insure 
against exogenous shocks, or to compensate regions for low tax capacity.  Kwon and 
Spilimbergo (2005) model the determinants of Russian government expenditures, 
observing that regional expenditures tend to expand in booms and contract in recessions, 
providing little inter-regional redistribution or insurance against shocks.   
A recent working paper by Thornton and Nagy (2006b) estimates the 
determinants of regional expenditures using a panel data base of Russia’s regions for 
1998-2003. (Their empirical results are summarized, below, with permission of the 
authors).  They find that the strongest determinant of government expenditures is federal 
administrative employment per capita.  However, there is little evidence that federal 
expenditures serve to reduce levels of regional inequality.  Changes in federal transfers 
are inversely related to changes in measures of “social needs” such as the dependency 
ratio and the rate of unemployment during the period studied. 
    Table 6 looks at differences in per capita government expenditures among 
regions. There is little evidence that government expenditures are directed toward the 
reduction in income inequalities.  A one percent rise in per capita income is associated 
with a rise of 0.7 percent in government expenditures in the region. Government 
expenditures per capita are higher in regions that benefit from a positive oil shock.  
Government expenditures are also higher in manufacturing regions when they experience 
a decline in real exchange rate, which, on net, should increase the competitiveness of 
domestic producers. 
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regional oil share as proxies measuring a region’s priority to the center. Government 
expenditures per capita are positively related to the number of federal administrative 
employees per capita and the energy share.  Dummy variables for Moscow city and 
Moscow oblast are positive, but only the latter is significant. 
Table 7 presents the estimation of the determinants of federal transfers.   A 
primary determinant of federal transfers is the index of budgetary requirements (BRI), 
which indexes the costs of education, health, and social assistance, but also includes 
provision of federal administrative and security assistance.   The coefficient on an index 
of regional fuel share times oil price is negative and significant. Federal transfers fall 
with an increase in tax arrears.  The coefficient between federal transfers and 
unemployment is negative, but insignificant.  Again, conditional on other characteristics, 
Moscow city and Moscow oblast receive significantly more federal transfers per capita 
than other regions. 
  Do Russian budget expenditures respond to measures of social need?  In Table 8 
we look at the determinants of social expenditures, using a regional cross-section for 
1999.  The dependent variable in the estimates is total expenditure on social needs per 
capita, including education, health, social policy, and housing.  The independent variables 
are the federal Budgetary Requirements Index, a direct, weighted index of observed 
categories of social needs (number of school children, number of pensioners, and number 
of veterans) and the unemployment rate.  In these estimates, social expenditures rise with 
an increase in the BRI.  However, they are negatively correlated with a direct index of 
“number of needy” per capita and negatively correlated with the unemployment rate.  
Again, Moscow city receives significantly higher social expenditures than other regions.    
 
7.  Lessons from the Chinese and Russian Fiscal Reforms  
  China’s rapid economic growth of the past two decades makes it easy to see 
China as a positive example of policies that worked.   It does, in fact, appear that China’s 
fiscal reforms got more right than wrong, at least in comparison with Russia. First, we list 
some of the obvious comparisons that emerge from our survey.  Then we elaborate, 
briefly on the lessons from the comparison. 
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reform: 
•  Both countries have increased the role of market mechanisms relative to 
administrative mechanisms in government policy.  Yet, both countries depend on 
large-scale firms to provide implicit social services and, in China, to maintain 
excess employment.  But China’s growth is based on a rapid increase in the share 
of small and medium-sized firms while Russia’s small-scale sector has 
languished. 
•  Both countries have increased the role of market mechanisms relative to 
administrative mechanisms in government policy.  Yet, both countries depend on 
large-scale firms to provide implicit social services and, in China, to maintain 
excess employment.  But China's growth is based on a rapid increase in the share 
of small and medium-sized firms while Russia's small-scale sector has languished. 
•  In China, re-centralization of budget functions was associated with gradual 
separation of enterprise activities and the state sector.  In Russia, re-centralization 
has been linked with expanding state ownership and control of enterprises. 
•  Government budget expenditures were consistently lower in all periods in China 
than in Russia, whether one focuses on the consolidated central and sub-national 
accounts or on the federal level alone. 
•  China’s public sector was substantially more decentralized in all periods, 
measured on two dimensions—the decentralization of public-service 
administration and the effective separation of the public sector from the producing 
sector, as signaled by the replacement of market coordination for administrative 
direction. 
•  In China, there were many separate municipalities attracting foreign investment 
and growth.  In Russia, foreign direct investment has been channeled primarily 
through Moscow.  
•  In China, local governments that were allowed to keep marginal increases in local 
tax revenue had incentives to pursue growth-supporting policies.  These coastal 
regions enjoyed high growth, assisted by foreign investment and openness to the 
international market.  Central government investment, in contrast, was directed to 
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risk has fostered a short-run orientation and capital flight. 
•  Over a period of 25 years, China accomplished an extraordinary structural change 
from agriculture to industry and from public to private employment.  Although 
Russia has free labor markets and partially-free housing markets, out-migration 
from poor regions has been slow and one-third of employment is in the public 
sector. 
•  Fiscal deficits and rapid expansion of credit have threatened stability in both 
countries, but China has proved more successful than Russia in managing 
macroeconomic policies. Russia’s fiscal crisis in 1998 provides a warning to 
China that macroeconomic mismanagement can destroy growth. 
•  Provincial units in both countries are extremely heterogeneous in their resource 
bases and incomes and transition has increased income disparities in both 
countries.  In Russia, the budget directed to pensions and health insurance is about 
7.5 percent of GDP—larger than in China.  However, central transfers in both 
countries are positively related to income levels and changes. 
 
Fiscal Policies in China 
 In the initial fiscal decentralization of the early 1980s, provinces were given more 
control over revenues and expenditures, but they also faced unfunded mandates to prop 
up unprofitable state firms and maintain their social services.  The center allowed regions 
to retain a growing share of revenues.  In addition, provinces funded services with 
increases in extra-budgetary fees and political credits from state-owned banks.  While 
credit expansion fueled inflation, those provinces that retained marginal tax revenues had 
incentives to encourage economic growth. 
  The 1994 fiscal reforms recentralized many revenues while expenditures 
remained decentralized.  The resulting system of central transfers to the provinces 
appears to have resulted in harder budget constraints for the provinces.  The strong 
correlation between provincial incomes and provincial budgets played a strong role in 
encouraging growth-enhancing policies by provincial governments.  Meanwhile, the 
commercialization of state-owned banks gradually led to a reduction in policy loans to 
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sub-national units, increased its share of GDP from about 12 percent to 20 percent of 
GDP and the center increased its share of total government revenue to 30 percent, China 
maintained a macroeconomic environment of low inflation despite the pressures of 
rapidly accumulating foreign exchange reserves from its large balance of payments 
surplus. 
  The decentralization of China’s public sector policies afforded notable advantages 
but also heavy costs.  Administrative decentralization was appropriate to the 
heterogeneity of China’s regions, allowing individual regions to undertake local 
initiatives.  Decentralization also fostered the separation of the government and the 
enterprise by encouraging the substitution of markets and competition for administrative 
coordination. True, the central government continued to impose constraints on market 
forces—for example, in the failure to formalize property rights to agricultural land, in the 
direction of investment to state-owned firms, in regulatory barriers to foreign firms.  In 
the absence of financial markets, there are still barriers to the movement of capital to 
more productive activities outside of a narrow locality.  However, all constituencies 
appear to benefit from market-supporting change. 
  On the other hand, decentralization imposes costs as well.  Wong and Bird (2005) 
consider China’s present fiscal system to be “unsatisfactory” for a number of reasons.  
Poorly designed VAT and enterprise income taxes create disincentives for efficient 
behavior; high taxes on banking hinder financial sector development; and weak tax 
administration generates corruption.  Government funds are often spent inefficiently, the 
governmental administrative burden remains high, the budgeting process is often 
completed late, and auditing is weak.  
  Wong and Bird argue that the decline in officially reported extra-budgetary 
revenues and expenditures is largely illusory, as extra-budget expenditures go unreported.  
There are many hidden fees, which are a particular burden in poor rural areas.  Wile 
official sources claim that extra-budgetary funds have fallen to 15 percent of GDP, Wong 
and Bird estimate their continuing share at 19 to 27 percent of GDP. 
  Our regressions also support the conclusion that China’s fiscal reform had led to 
increased fiscal disparities between provinces.  Because many public goods are provided 
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parts of China.  The lack of public health funding is particularly costly for the rural poor 
and the migrant workers seeking jobs in growing cities.   
 
Fiscal Policies in Russia 
  Russia’s initial years of transition are a testimony to the devastating consequences 
of macroeconomic mismanagement.  Initially, total budget expenditure remained at 
approximately 40 percent of GDP, generating a budget deficit equal to almost 10 percent 
of GDP.  Ballooning central bank credits to industrial exporters, agriculture, former 
Soviet republics, and the federal treasury generated hyperinflation of 2500 percent.  The 
subsequent process of disinflation was equally difficult.  Firms accumulated tax arrears, 
paying their local taxes in-kind, if at all. Government administrations and enterprises ran 
up payment and wage arrears, and the cost of financing short-term borrowing 
skyrocketed.  In August, 1998, the Russian government defaulted on its ruble debt and 
devaluation fueled a banking crisis as well.  After a four-fold devaluation of the currency 
that cut per capita income to 75 percent of its previous level, the Russian government 
finally got its fiscal house in order. 
  As in China, the government of the Russian Federation transferred most 
expenditure obligations for health, education, pensions, and utilities to the territorial and 
municipal levels of government.  However, the territories lacked any formal commitment 
linking their tax retention to their expenditure mandates.  Decentralization in Russia was 
a cat-and-mouse game in which territorial administrations colluded with local enterprises 
to shelter their income in exchange for in-kind social services covering some portion of 
the unfunded mandates imposed on local governments.  Since legal tax rates added up to 
more than 100 percent of enterprise value added, new entrants to the market could be 
expropriated at any time, while local governments had incentives to shelter existing large 
firms from competitive pressures.   
As in China, the Russian bureaucratic system created opportunities for asset 
stripping of public assets to private entrepreneurs, but in a risky and violent environment, 
decision-makers with control rights to wealth in Russia had incentives to move their 
portfolio offshore instead of undertaking profitable production at home. 
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of a new budget code and the introduction of measures, such as the monetization of a 
range of in-kind subsidies that could provide a framework for a strong, accountable 
public sector.  Moreover, a substantial revenue surplus funded by export taxes and 
extraction fees on energy is supporting a balanced budget, repayment of government 
debt, and accumulation of a stabilization fund.  However, an estimation of the 
determinants of social expenditure presented here indicates that changes in regional 
social expenditures move inversely with the number of “needy” and with the 
unemployment rate in a region.  Central transfers to the regions are positively correlated 
with differences in per capita income, providing no evidence of consumption smoothing. 
However carefully defined are the formal rules for distribution of social assistance 
funds, in practice, it appears to be the ad hoc negotiated agreements between the center 
and regions that account for the largest transfers.  Writing in the Moscow Times (July, 
2005), Alexei Makrushin and Ksenia Yudayeva say, “How did this happen in the era of 
the Putin power vertical? As strange as it may seem, the biggest threat to fiscal federalism 
today is coming from the federal government itself. First, the power vertical has in effect 
eliminated all checks and balances, which makes it relatively easy to change the way 
financial assistance is divvied up. Second, by appointing governors, the Kremlin is 
becoming more and more partial in the way it creates budget policy.” 
In Russia's case, then, neither decentralized nor centralized fiscal policies have 
succeeded in creating the necessary incentives for increased productivity and structural 
change.  In Russia, recentralization has been associated with expansion of state 
ownership of enterprises and production by territorial governments, state ministries, state 
banks, and the natural monopolies.  In a resource-owning country in which ownership of 
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Figure 2:  China's Central Government Fiscal Shares and Deficits
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Table 1:  Provincial Chinese Growth Regressions 
 
  
Provincial growth rate 
regressed on lagged values:  OLS 
Pooled 
Fixed Effects  2SLS  GMM 
        
Exports per capita  0.0055 -0.0033 0.0351 0.0316 
  (0.0073) (0.0071)  (0.0126)***  (0.0116)***
 
Provincial revenue per capita  0.1844 0.0511  -0.0025  0.4589 
  (0.0905)**  (0.0672) (0.0612) (0.1260)***
 
Revenue squared  -0.4240 -0.1214   -0.6129 
  (0.1506)*** (0.1033)    (0.2143)***
 
Provincial transfers per capita  0.1101  0.0633 0.2447 0.1084 
  (0.0386)*** (0.0393)  (0.0896)** (0.0629)* 
 
Capital expenditure share  0.0024 0.0216  -0.1699  0.0296 
  (0.0316) (0.0334)  (0.0844)**  (0.0358) 
 
Social expenditure share  0.0773 -0.0838 0.0753 0.0085 
  (0.0305)** (0.0310)**  (0.0594)  (0.0321) 
 
Administrative staff per capita  -1.1375 -1.4576  -1.2473 1.6590 
  (0.3909)** (0.9394)  (0.6104)**  (1.8250) 
Central government share of 
national revenues  0.5215  0.5403 0.5794 0.2558 
  (0.0569)*** (0.0370)*** (0.0936)** (0.0853)***
 
National expenditures share of 
GDP  -0.0266 -0.0575 0.0107  -0.8835 
  (0.0667)  (0.0502) (0.1490) (0.2424)***
 
National deficit share of GDP  -1.4513  -1.6564 -1.4352 -0.5145 
  (0.2351)*** (0.1488)*** (0.6538)** (0.2868)* 
National extra-budgetary 
expenditures share of GDP  0.1365 0.0706  -0.6930  0.0434 
  (0.2042)  (0.1244) (0.4561) (0.0886) 
 
1994 Provincial GDP  0.0055   0.0115   
  (0.0087)   (0.0213)   
Lagged growth rate       -0.5024 
       (0.0378)***
 
Constant  -0.1693   -0.1520  0.0550 
  (0.0321)***   (0.0433)***  (0.0046)***
        
R
2 0.40  0.73 0.19 0.48 
Log Likelihood  889.4 1007.0    922.7 
Note: standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, (*), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
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Table 2:  Provincial Revenue, Expenditures, and Transfers 
 
Regressed with OLS 







       
Ln (Provincial GDP per capita)  0.8005 0.8004  0.0312 
  (0.0463)*** (0.0806)***  (0.0099)***
 
Provincial FDI ratio  1.3479 -4.4016  -0.4302 
  (0.4604)** (0.8016)***  (0.0887)***
 
Provincial trade ratio  0.3070 0.5037  0.0246 
  (0.0526)*** (0.0853)***  (0.0111)** 
 
National revenues as share of GDP  4.1239 8.6966  0.7666 
  (0.6159)*** (0.9859)***  (0.1125)***
National extra-budgetary revenues as share of 
GDP     0.1629 
     (0.5209) 
 
Dependency Ratio   0.0147  0.0009 
   (0.0044)***  (0.0006)* 
 
Secondary Education Attainment Ratio  2.6235   -0.2748 
  (0.4445)**   (0.1065)** 
 
Constant  -3.7300 -3.9535  -0.0929 
  (0.1301)** (0.2290)***  (0.0467)***
     
R
2 0.90 0.69  0.27 
Log Likelihood  -8.1 -170.3  553.4 
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Table 3:  Selected Provincial Expenditures 
 
 
Regressed with OLS 











Provincial GDP per capita   0.0289    0.0351  0.0057 
  (0.0011)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0010)***
 
Provincial FDI ratio   -0.0536 0.0241  -0.0037 
  (0.0107)*** (0.0230)  (0.0095) 
 
Provincial trade ratio   0.0052 -0.0086  0.0038 
  (0.0013)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0012)***
 
Provincial revenues as share of GDP  0.1068 0.0557 0.0028 
  (0.0141)*** (0.0303)*  (0.0125) 
 
Provincial transfers as share of GDP   0.0799 0.1672 0.0796 
  (0.0034)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0030)***
 
Central gov’t share of national revenues  0.0019 -0.0236 -0.0085 
  (0.0043) (0.0092)***  (0.0038)** 
 
Dependency Ratio   0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 
  (0.0001)** (0.0001)***  (0.0001) 
 
Secondary Education Attainment Ratio  0.0725 0.0555 0.0034 
  (0.0127)** (0.0273)** (0.0112) 
 
Constant  -0.0290 -0.0375  0.0060 
  (0.0046)** (0.0100)***  (0.0041) 
     
R
2 0.92 0.77 0.75 
Log Likelihood  1291.46 1030.74  1333.55 
Note: standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, (*), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
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Table 4:  Distribution of Russian Tax Revenues, 2004 







I. Federal taxes and fees        
Tax on profits at rates set for RF  100     
Tax on profits at rates set for Subject    100   
Income tax on individuals    70 30 
Value added tax  100     
Alcohol excise  100     
Excises on alcohol products    100   
Excises on beer    100   
Excises on tobacco products  100     
Excises on gasoline, diesel fuel  40 60   
Excises on cars and motorcycles  100     
Import duties  100     
Hydrocarbon extraction tax   100     
Mineral extraction tax oil  95 5   
Mineral extraction tax gas  100 0   
Mineral extraction tax other  40 60   
Mineral extraction tax continental shelf    100     
Water tax  100     
Single social tax  100     
Government export duties   100     
         
II. Regional taxes*        
Transport tax    100   
Tax on property of organizations    100   
         
II  Local Taxes        
Land Tax      100 
Single Agricultural Tax      100 
         
III Other Taxes        
Single tax    90   
Imputed single small-scale tax      100 
Production Sharing Agreements, prior to 
1995 
20 80   
Natural Gas Extraction under PSA  95 5   
Mineral Extraction (Royalties) Continental 
Shelf 
100     
         
Source:  Institute of Economies in Transition, p 97, Table 11    
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Table 5:  Structure of Russian Federal Expenditure 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Social Expenditure 
(Ed, health, soc policy) 
35.4 37.1 33.4 33.3 36.0 35.8 37.2
Expenditure on govt. admin and law   6.5 7.1 6.7 6.9 7.3  7.5  7.5
Expenditure on the economy  
(incl ind, ag, trans, commun) 
9.5 9.0 8.9 17.3 13.3 13.3 13.3
Expenditure on housing   19.3 17.1 17.1 13.0 11.5  11.2  10.
Other   29.3 29.6 33.8 29.5 31.8  32.2  31.4
Total Expenditures   100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 6:  Determinants of Russian Total Expenditures 
  (1) (2) 
















dMoscow_city   0.169 
   (0.334) 
 
dMoscow_oblast   0.351 
   (0.112)*** 
 
Constant 2.593  2.755 
 (1.090)**  (1.285)** 
 
Observations 248  248 
R
2 0.59 0.65 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, (*), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
Variables are deflated using federal average CPI (1998=100).   
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Table 7:  Determinants of Russian Federal Transfers 
 (1)  (2) 
    




















dMoscow_city   0.599 
   (0.241)** 
 
dMoscow_oblast   0.429 
   (0.099)*** 
 
Constant 10.732  10.492 
 (1.319)***  (1.360)*** 
 
Observations 247  247 
R
2 0.56 0.56 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, (*), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
Variables are deflated using federal average CPI (1998=100).   
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Table 8:  Determinants of Russian Social Expenditures (1999) 
 (1)  (2) 
    
Log budgetary requirement index  0.791  0.792 
 (0.066)***  (0.064)*** 
 
Log per capita nr. of needy   -0.046  -0.039 
 (0.022)**  (0.022)* 
 
Log unemployment rate  -0.347  -0.281 
 (0.088)***  (0.089)*** 
 
dMoscow_city   0.659 
   (0.257)** 
 
dMoscow_oblast   0.030 
   (0.245) 
 
Constant 8.387  8.178 
 (0.236)***  (0.245)*** 
 
Observations 79  79 
R
2 0.67 0.69 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, (*), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
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